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Introduction 
Fred D. Gray was thirty-two years old when he filed Lee v. Macon 
County Board of Education.1 The suit quickly grew in scope and set in 
motion sweeping remedial orders compelling the desegregation of school 
districts, high school athletic conferences, junior colleges, trade schools, 
and four-year colleges and universities.2 Professor Owen M. Fiss gave 
 
†  James A. Webster Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. I 
am deeply thankful for comments from my Wake Forest colleagues at a 
faculty workshop and from my co-participants at the Case Western University 
School of Law’s symposium, In Honor of Fred Grey: Making Civil Rights 
Law from Rosa Parks to the 21st Century. Comments welcome via email at 
parkerwm@wfu.edu. 
1. Fred D. Gray, Bus Ride to Justice: Changing the System by the 
System 6, 204 (rev. ed. 2013). 
2. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp. 103, 110–12 (M.D. Ala. 1970) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam) (requiring disestablishment of dual systems 
for trade schools and junior colleges); Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 283 
F. Supp. 194, 198–99 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (three-judge court) (per curiam) 
(mandating integration of athletic conferences and associations for high 
schools and junior colleges and recognizing voluntary integration of collegiate 
conferences); Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 478 (M.D. 
Ala. 1967) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (ordering desegregation of trade 
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the remedy gushing praise, calling it “as ingenious, as path-breaking, as 
innovative as something like Marbury v. Madison.”3 
This Symposium rightly celebrates Mr. Gray, one of Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law’s most famous graduates.4 When he 
finished law school and returned home to Alabama in 1954, he vowed 
to “destroy everything segregated [he] could find.”5 The time and place 
were ripe for change. The Supreme Court had just decided Brown v. 
Board of Education,6 and Alabama offered a plethora of places to battle 
segregation. As one of Alabama’s few African American lawyers, Mr. 
Gray quickly began filing suits to challenge Alabama’s racial hierarchy.7 
While Lee v. Macon County may not be Mr. Gray’s most well-
known case (that honor properly belongs to his representation of Rosa 
Parks in her criminal case for refusing to give up her bus seat),8 Lee v. 
Macon County presents a unique vehicle for examining the role of the 
law in dismantling de jure school segregation. The case offered perhaps 
the best opportunity for litigation to promote racial equality in Ameri-
can schools. The success (and failure) of this school desegregation case, 
 
schools, vocational schools, and state colleges), aff’d sub nom. Wallace v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. 
Supp. 743, 758 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (school 
districts and State defendants added to the suit). The University of Ala-
bama, Auburn, and other Alabama colleges not governed by the Alabama 
State Board of Education, were exempt, as were other school districts already 
sued for de jure segregation. See Lee, 267 F. Supp. at 484 n.29; Jack Bass, 
Taming the Storm: The Life and Times of Judge Frank M. Johnson, 
Jr., and the South’s Fight over Civil Rights 228 (1993); Gray, supra 
note 1, at 209–10. The K–12 portion of the lawsuit was eventually divided 
into separate suits for each school district. Lee v. Lee Cty. Bd. of Educ., 963 
F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
3. Bass, supra note 2, at 235 (quoting Professor Fiss from an interview con-
ducted on June 17, 1989). 
4. At the time, the school was called Western Reserve University School of 
Law. Mr. Gray would have preferred attending the law school in his home 
state, University of Alabama School of Law, but the school was for whites 
only. He was entitled to tuition reimbursement for the extra cost of attending 
out of state (a part of separate but equal), but only after successfully comple-
ting his first semester. Finding the money upfront for out of state law school 
tuition was not easy for Mr. Gray. Gray, supra note 1, at 14–19. 
5. Id. at xi. 
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7. Gray, supra note 1, at 37, 43. 
8. Id. at 55–62. Mr. Gray also represented four African American women in 
their suit seeking to have the state statutes and city ordinances mandating 
segregated buses be held unconstitutional. See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. 
Supp. 707 (1956) (three-judge court), aff’g 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam). 
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thus, affords a unique chance to discover the true potential of litigation 
as a means to dismantling de jure segregation. 
Alabama is not an obvious location for successful school desegre-
gation. The state is not generally known for being at the forefront of 
creating racial equality, particularly when the suit started in 1963. More 
likely to come to mind is Governor George Wallace standing in the 
schoolhouse door to prevent integration.9 Yet Alabama, through Lee v. 
Macon County, is where K–12 school desegregation litigation had one 
of its best chances for success.10 I make this argument, which is largely 
based on the people involved in the case, in Part I of this Article. Part 
I also includes an overview of the litigation, from its beginning in 1963 
to the present day (remarkably, aspects of the suit are still ongoing in 
2017). 
Part II examines the mixed results of the K–12 portion of Lee v. 
Macon County—inequalities are vastly improved since 1963, but per-
sistent patterns of segregation and inequities remain. Here I focus on 
persistent segregation by school buildings, but also on the loss of Afri-
can American teachers and the persistence of a racial achievement gap. 
Part III addresses a continuing debate in the academic literature 
(and movies like Selma): the role of the litigation in creating change, as 
compared to social mobilization.11 One could easily criticize the use-
fulness of Lee v. Macon County given the continuing segregation and 
inequality found in Alabama. In the end, however, I believe the lawsuit 
helped move Alabama closer to educational equity. Alabama would be 
worse off if Mr. Gray had not had the courage to file Lee v. Macon 
County. 
I. A DREAM TEAM AIMS HIGH 
Lee v. Macon County started with relatively minor goals. Mr. Gray 
filed the suit in January 1963, seeking admission of a select group of 
African American students to the all-white Tuskegee Public High 
School, a small rural school.12 At the time, nine years after Brown I, 
 
9. Bass, supra note 2, at 207 (noting Wallace’s efforts to prevent integration 
at the University of Alabama). 
10. I am excluding here voluntary school integration, which is an entirely diff-
erent approach than school desegregation litigation. 
11. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts 
Bring About Social Change? (2d ed. 2008) (discussing social change 
through litigation in civil rights); see infra notes 135–138 and accompanying 
text (discussing Rosenberg’s book). 
12. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 744–45 (M.D. Ala. 1964) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam). This was not the first time African Amer-
icans in Tuskegee sought admission to the white schools. See Brian K. 
Landsberg, Enforcing Desegregation: A Case Study of Federal District Court 
Power and Social Change in Macon County Alabama, 48 L. & Soc’y Rev. 
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Alabama public schools were entirely segregated; not a single African 
American student attended a white school, and no white student atten-
ded an African American school.13 On August 13, 1963, U.S. District 
Court Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. ordered nonracial school assign-
ments in the upcoming school year, set to start the next month, and a 
more comprehensive desegregation plan for the following year.14 The 
school board complied and assigned thirteen African American students 
to Tuskegee Public High School.15 
The beginning of Lee v. Macon County was fairly typical of school 
desegregation at the time. The goal then was the integration of white 
schools with the admission of a handful of African American students, 
typically selected as the best and brightest of the African American 
community and with parents willing to put their children onto the front 
lines of actualizing racial mixing in schools.16 Within a year, however, 
the case took on its unique, comprehensive shape. At times in its long 
life of fifty-three years and counting, it represented true opportunities 
for social change through litigation. To learn more about that promise, 
the next sections examine Macon County, the Dream Team of players, 
and the resulting remedial orders. 
A. The Place 
Tuskegee Public High School is located in Macon County, Alabama, 
a county notable for two reasons. First, it is and was a predominately 
black county.17 Yet in 1963, whites “controlled all the political offices, 
 
867, 871–72 (2014) (detailing requests in 1955 and 1962); see also infra note 
39 (noting earlier requests by named plaintiffs in Lee v. Macon County). As 
early as 1950, the Tuskegee Civil Association published a report demon-
strating school funding inequality. Landsberg, supra, at 871; see also Erwing 
W. Wadsworth, A Historical Perspective of Education in Macon County, 
Alabama: 1836–1967, at 334 (Apr. 8, 1969) (Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, 
Auburn University) (on file with author) (recounting a request in 1951 for 
equality in facilities). 
13. Landsberg, supra note 12, at 873. 
14. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 221 F. Supp. 297, 300 (M.D. Ala. 1963). 
15. Forty-eight African American students applied for admission to Tuskegee 
High School, but the school board only approved thirteen. Landsberg, supra 
note 12, at 875. The board gave the students both personality and intelli-
gence tests to select students for admission, and made choices in consultation 
with the U.S. Department of Justice. Robert J. Norrell, Reaping the 
Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee 139 (2d ed. 
1998). 
16. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme 
Court and School Integration: 1954–1978, at 78–87 (1979). 
17. Norrell, supra note 15, at x (“Macon County, for which Tuskegee is the 
seat of government, had a higher percentage of black population—about 
eighty-four percent—than any other county in the United States in the 
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including the Board of Education.”18 For whites, their numerical min-
ority status meant affording rights to African Americans could cause 
the loss of their power—and the possibility that African Americans 
would in turn oppress them as much as they had oppressed African 
Americans. That made affording any rights to African Americans frigh-
tening to many white citizens of Macon County. From an African Am-
erican perspective, their numbers were the opposite of frightening. Their 
numerical strength gave them a real opportunity for political power and 
a large community of moral support to pursue equality throughout the 
county. 
A second feature of Macon County increased the chances of African 
Americans gaining political power and economic support. Its county 
seat, Tuskegee, was home to two segregated entities that empowered 
its African American citizenry. In 1881, Booker T. Washington founded 
the Tuskegee Institute for educating African Americans.19 The city also 
housed the Tuskegee Veterans Hospital.20 The hospital was founded 
solely for African American veterans and was staffed by African Ameri-
can doctors and nurses. Critically, employment at the Tuskegee Insti-
tute or Tuskegee Veterans Hospital gave their workers “economic in-
dependence.”21 That independence had been reflected as early as 1941, 
when future voting rights plaintiff Dr. Charles G. Gomillion formed the 
Tuskegee Civil Association (TCA) to promote racial equality.22 
In sum, Macon County was well positioned as a place to litigate 
the need to integrate schools. It housed a number of educated, economi-
cally independent African American citizens committed to advancing 
the cause of racial equality, including school desegregation.23 Detroit 
Lee, the lead plaintiff in Lee v. Macon County, for example, worked for 
 
1960s.”); see also infra note 99 (discussing the demographics of Macon 
County in the twenty-first century). 
18. Frank M. Johnson, Jr., School Desegregation Problems in the South: An 
Historical Perspective, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 1157, 1167 (1970). That changed 
in the late 1960s, when African Americans were elected to critical offices, 
including sheriff and mayor. Norrell, supra note 15, at 188–90, 200–02. By 
1972, eighty percent of elected local officials were African American, the most 
of any place in the United States. Id. at 202. 
19. The school was originally named the Normal School for Colored Teachers. 
It later became the training site for the Tuskegee Airmen. It is now named 
Tuskegee University. See Gray, supra note 1, at 109. 
20. Id. at 109–10. 
21. Norrell, supra note 15, at 27–30. From the beginning, TCA had a large 
role in Lee v. Macon. Id. at 137. 
22. Id. at 41. 
23. See Wadsworth, supra note 12, at 324 (noting that a “large core of 
intelligent, educated Negroes” lived in Tuskegee). 
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Tuskegee Veterans Hospital.24 Macon County had the makings of a 
community committed to integration. 
B. The People 
The story of Lee v. Macon County would be fundamentally different 
without Governor George Wallace, who took office a mere week before 
Mr. Gray filed Lee v. Macon County. At his inauguration for governor, 
he had declared his opposition to Mr. Gray’s cause of integration: 
“segregation now . . . segregation tomorrow . . . segregation forever.”25 
Learning that the Macon County school board intended to follow Judge 
Johnson’s 1963 order and allow African American students into Tus-
kegee Public High School, Governor Wallace employed the Alabama 
State Troopers and National Guard to close and keep closed Tuskegee 
Public High School.26 He also spent state monies to open the all-white, 
ostensibly private Macon Academy, so white students and teachers 
would have a place for education.27 
Governor Wallace paid a high price for his intervention. His actions 
demonstrated his and the State’s complicity in establishing and main-
taining de jure segregation at the local level, making them appropriate 
parties and potentially legally responsible in cases like Lee v. Macon 
County. Mr. Gray successfully moved to add Governor Wallace and 
other state officials as defendants in 1964.28 
 
24. See Norrell, supra note 15, at 137. 
25. George C. Wallace, Governor, Ala., Inaugural Address 2 (Jan. 14, 1963), 
(transcript available at http://digital.archives.alabama.gov/cdm/singleitem/ 
collection/voices/id/2952/rec/5 [https://perma.cc/4LQB-JJAR]).  
26. See Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1157, 1203 (2000) (noting that the lawsuit quickly captured the governor’s 
attention). Other Alabama school districts also initially indicated their in-
tention to integrate schools, only to be ordered otherwise by the State of 
Alabama. See Bass, supra note 2, at 208–10 (noting the intention of Huntsville 
to begin integration without court order and the plans of Birmingham and 
Mobile to comply with integration orders); Johnson, supra note 18, at 1169 
(noting that school districts with small African American populations 
indicated a willingness to integrate as early as 1965 but changed their course 
of action after state involvement). 
27. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 747 (M.D. Ala. 1964) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam). His efforts were also directed toward other 
school districts newly under court order to desegregate—Birmingham, 
Huntsville, and Mobile. Landsberg, supra note 12, at 876. Interestingly, Jim 
Clark, sheriff of Selma, was on hand with his “mounted posse” to offer their 
support. Norrell, supra note 15, at 147. 
28. Lee, 231 F. Supp. at 745, 750–51. The state defendants included the Alabama 
State Board of Education, the State Superintendent of Education, and 
Governor Wallace as President of the State Board of Education. Governor 
Wallace was not sued in his capacity as Governor of Alabama. For a detailed 
review of the State of Alabama’s actions to prevent school integration, see Lee 
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Forcing Governor Wallace’s inclusion in Lee v. Macon County set 
the stage for far-reaching litigation. Including state officials as defen-
dants created an exceptionally strong opportunity to desegregate Ala-
bama schools. Now, rather than filing individual school desegregation 
suits in each of Alabama’s over one hundred school districts with their 
own sets of plaintiffs, lawyers, and courtrooms, plaintiffs would litigate 
the validity of and remedy for Alabama’s de jure segregation in one 
courtroom, with one set of lawyers.29 In addition, the state by definition 
had statewide power, and having both the state and individual school 
districts subject to court order created the opportunity for more expan-
sive and thorough remedies. 
Just as critically, the state defendants faced U.S. District Court 
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. A son of Alabama and former college and 
law school classmate of Governor Wallace, Judge Johnson had already 
proven more than willing to side with civil rights plaintiffs.30 The U.S. 
Department of Justice often sought to litigate civil rights cases in his 
courtroom, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. called him “a man who 
gave true meaning to the word ‘justice.’”31 Having Judge Johnson presi-
ding over a statewide suit to desegregate Alabama schools presented a 
wealth of opportunities to the plaintiffs. The state defendants, fully 
aware of Judge Johnson’s willingness to side with civil rights plaintiffs, 
fought their joinder in the lawsuit, but without success.32 
 
v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 462–72 (M.D. Ala. 1967) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 
U.S. 215 (1967). 
29. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1168–69 (“The massive intervention by the Gov-
ernor and other State officials provided the means to shortcut in Alabama 
the slow district-by-district litigation which was taking so much time and 
effort all over the South.”). 
30. See, e.g., Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (three-
judge court) (holding state statutes and city ordinances requiring segregated 
city buses unconstitutional), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); United 
States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of Klu Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897, 907 
(M.D. Ala. 1961) (ordering protections for Freedom Riders). But see 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1958) (ruling that 
the court lacked jurisdiction), aff’d, 270 F.2d 594, 601 (5th Cir. 1959), rev’d, 
364 U.S. 339, 348 (1960) (holding the district court had jurisdiction to 
consider the plaintiff’s claims of racial gerrymandering). See generally David 
J. Garrow, Visionaries of the Law: John Minor Wisdom and Frank M. 
Johnson, Jr., 109 Yale L.J. 1219, 1230–34 (2000) (discussing Judge Johnson’s 
many court decisions in support of civil rights issues). 
31. Bass, supra note 2, at 3. 
32. Joseph M. Bagley, School Desegregation, Law and Order, and Litigating 
Social Justice in Alabama, 1954–1973, at 301–03 (Jan. 5, 2014) (unpublished 
dissertation, Georgia State University), http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=history_diss [https://perma.cc/ 
87BN-YD3D]. 
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While Judge Johnson was the judge most intimately involved in 
Lee v. Macon County, he operated with the support of his fellow federal 
judges. His task would have been impossible if the Fifth Circuit had 
not affirmed his orders and had not already demonstrated its commit-
ment to effective school desegregation.33 The Fifth Circuit, particularly 
Judge John Minor Wisdom, was a strong supporter of plaintiffs in civil 
rights litigation.34 At the time, many civil rights matters necessitated a 
three-judge district court, and Judge Johnson had support there as 
well.35 
Appearing before Judge Johnson was, to borrow a phrase from an-
other noteworthy Twentieth Century case, a “Dream Team” of plain-
tiffs’ lawyers. The private plaintiffs had knowledgeable and committed 
representation. A native son, Mr. Gray was well connected to Ala-
bama’s African American community.36 He had already successfully 
argued Gomillion v. Lightfoot37 before the Supreme Court.38 His named 
plaintiffs (Detroit and Hattie, on behalf of their sons Anthony and 
Henry Lee) had waited until Mr. Gray had the time to file a suit on 
their behalf and were fully committed to desegregating Alabama 
schools.39 The NAACP and NAACP-LDF sent their experienced civil 
 
33. Most important was Judge Wisdom’s opinion in United States v. Jefferson 
County, the school desegregation suit for Birmingham, Alabama. United 
States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff’d on 
reh’g en banc, 380 F.2d 385, 390 (5th Cir. 1967). For more detail about the 
importance of this decision, see Garrow, supra note 30, at 1224–25. 
34. Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 111; Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: 
Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1691, 1718 n.136 (2004). 
35. The three-judge panel hearing much of Lee v. Macon County was composed 
of District Court Judges Harlan Hobart Grooms and Judge Johnson and 
Fifth Circuit Judge Richard T. Rives. Judge Rives was as notable for his 
commitment to civil rights as Judge Wisdom. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 744 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (three-judge court) (per 
curiam); see Parker, supra note 26, at 1187–88 n.210 (“Judge Ben F. 
Cameron dubbed Judge John R. Brown of Texas, Judge Elbert Parr Tuttle 
of Georgia, Judge Richard T. Rives of Alabama, and Judge John Minor 
Wisdom of Louisiana “The Four,” and the name came to symbolize the Fifth 
Circuit's strong commitment to civil rights.”). 
36. See Gray, supra note 1, at 28–29 (discussing some of the connections Mr. 
Gray had in Montgomery). 
37. 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (concluding that plaintiffs stated a cause of action 
under the U.S. Constitution to challenge the state’s changing “Tuskegee’s 
boundaries . . . to remove from the city all save four or five of its 400 Negro 
voters while not removing a single white voter or resident”). 
38. The case had been argued October 18–19, 1960. Id. at 339.  
39. As Mr. Gray explains, “Detroit Lee had wanted me to file such a lawsuit 
several years earlier, at a time when I was busy with some prior litigation.” 
Gray, supra note 1, at 204; see also Norrell, supra note 15, at 137 (noting 
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rights lawyers to Alabama to offer Gray assistance, which he readily 
accepted.40 
The private plaintiffs also received active support from the United 
States. One of Judge Johnson’s very first actions was joining the United 
States to the case.41 The Department of Justice (DOJ) represented the 
United States in Lee v. Macon County. Having the United States as a 
party meant the federal government could officially support private 
plaintiffs and their quest for school integration. Moreover, the federal 
government could use its enforcement powers to prevent the State of 
Alabama and local school districts from interfering with desegregation 
orders. Thus, any resulting court orders would be backed not only by 
private groups represented by the private plaintiffs, but by the federal 
Executive Branch as well.42 
The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations actively supported the 
cause of school desegregation in Alabama. President John F. Kennedy 
federalized the National Guard to ensure that Tuskegee Public High 
School opened in fall 1963. 43  The Executive Branch also gave its 
support in smaller ways. For example, future Assistant Attorney 
General for Civil Rights John Doar demonstrated personal interest in 
the students originally admitted by the school board.44 He wrote that 
his involvement “[took] the burden of policing the school board off the 
back of the Negroes’ attorney.”45 While the United States and private 
 
that Lee first asked in 1956 to pursue school desegregation, but was told to 
wait until voting rights were resolved). 
40. Bagley, supra note 32, at 187, 318 (noting the specific involvement of Director 
Counsel Jack Greenberg and future Chief Judge of the Southern District of 
New York Constance Baker Motley); see also Gray, supra note 1, at 199 
(noting that, conversely, the NCAAP-LDF was interested in Mr. Gray’s help 
because of his connections to the Middle District of Alabama). 
41. See Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 744–45 (M.D. Ala. 
1964) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (noting that the appearance of the 
United States as a party was “appropriate and necessary”). At the time, the 
United States lacked authority to file its own civil rights suits. Landsberg, 
supra note 12, at 872. 
42. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1171 (concluding that as of 1970 the Department 
of Justice had taken the lead because “[t]he volume of litigation [had] become 
so great”). 
43. Governor Wallace had ordered the National Guard to keep Tuskegee Public 
High School closed. President Kennedy federalized the National Guard and 
sent them home, “leaving only local authorities to keep the peace.” See 
Norrell, supra note 15, at 148. 
44. Landsberg, supra note 12, at 875. 
45. Id. (quoting 1963 memo by Doar). 
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plaintiffs sometimes had serious strategic disagreements, they were very 
often united in goal.46 
After passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Elementary 
and Secondary Schools Act of 1965 (ESEA), the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) also became involved in desegregating 
Alabama school districts.47 Derrick Bell, as Acting Director of HEW’s 
Office of Civil Rights, worked on behalf of HEW in Alabama.48 HEW 
negotiated plans with Alabama school districts not subject to court 
school desegregation orders, with the threat of withholding federal 
funds to school districts that failed to reach agreement with HEW. 
Although Judge Johnson at times opposed the involvement of HEW in 
Lee v. Macon County school districts, the role of HEW proved to be 
critical in actualizing school integration.49 
Other groups joined the lawsuit. To protect the rights of African 
American teachers, the Alabama State Teachers Association (ASTA) 
intervened as a plaintiff.50 Even Macon Academy was joined as a de-
fendant.51 
Although not an official party to the suit, the support of moderate 
whites also deserves mention. In the face of Judge Johnson’s first order 
to admit thirteen African Americans into the white high school, the 
white teachers “pledge[d] to honor [their] contracts.”52 The president of 
the Tuskegee High Parent Teachers Association, the high school foot-
ball coach, and the superintendent of schools worked in favor of desegre-
gation in 1963.53 Many white parents protested Governor Wallace’s 
closing of Tuskegee Public High School.54 
In sum, Lee v. Macon County held great promise in actualizing the 
ideals of Brown v. Board of Education. African Americans pledged 
 
46. Id. at 880 (describing differences in 1964). 
47. See generally Parker, supra note 34, at 1720–21 (discussing the role of HEW 
and DOJ in school desegregation during this time period). 
48. While DOJ initially resisted the role of HEW in overseeing the school dis-
tricts subject to remedial orders in Lee v. Macon County, DOJ eventually 
welcomed the role of HEW in managing the large project of overseeing the 
desegregation efforts of ninety-nine individual school districts. See Bass, 
supra note 2, at 225, 231; Bagley, supra note 32, at 495, 524. 
49. See Bass, supra note 2, at 231; Parker, supra note 34, at 1720–21. 
50. Gray, supra note 1, at 210–11. NEA replaced ASTA as the intervenor after 
the ASTA merged with the white teacher’s union in Alabama. Johnson, 
supra note 18, at 1171. 
51. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 757–58 (M.D. Ala. 1964) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam). 
52. Wadsworth, supra note 12, at 355. 
53. Norrell, supra note 15, at 138–140; Wadsworth, supra note 12, at 351. 
54. Norrell, supra note 15, at 145. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 4·2017 
Why Alabama School Desegregation Succeeded (And Failed) 
1101 
strong support to the case, and willingly sent their children to formerly 
all-white schools. Some whites even initially supported integration, and 
local school districts (including Macon County) indicated their inten-
tion to comply with integration orders. The remedial orders of Judge 
Johnson, the litigation strategy of the DOJ, and the administrative en-
forcement of HEW all supported the community’s quest for integrated 
schools. 
The only missing piece was the support of the State of Alabama. 
C. The Remedy 
In Lee v. Macon County, the African American community, high-
powered lawyers, cabinet-level departments, and noted federal judges 
all converged to integrate Alabama schools.55 No other school desegre-
gation case presented such a wide range of capable forces to achieve 
integration. The first remedial stage of the litigation lasted from 1963 
to 1970, and remedial orders were more limited than one might predict. 
Judge Johnson certainly did not shy away from supporting integration 
in his orders, but he was still operating in a State that aggressively 
opposed school integration. Perhaps for that reason more than any 
other, Judge Johnson’s remedial orders were more modest than one 
might envision. 
Judge Johnson’s first remedial order in 1963 was the most expansive 
type of school desegregation order at the time. Yet it still only required 
the nonracial application of Alabama’s Pupil Placement Law, a race 
neutral statute explicitly enacted to maintain segregation. 56  Only 
thirteen African American students, out of forty-eight who applied, 
were to be admitted to the de jure white school.57 As discussed in more 
detail infra, white parents quickly fled the school, leaving the thirteen 
African American students once again in a segregated school.58 
Judge Johnson’s second remedial order in 1964 broke new ground 
in school desegregation. At this time, the State of Alabama became the 
first state to be legally responsible for de jure segregation in its school 
districts. In all other respects, however, the 1964 order was modest. 
Judge Johnson, despite a request from Mr. Gray, declined to issue any 
 
55. The effectiveness of the orders as they relate specifically to Macon County 
is discussed in more detail infra Part II.A. 
56. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 221 F. Supp. 297, 300 (M.D. Ala. 1963). 
For the discriminatory nature of pupil placement laws, see Johnson, supra 
note 18, at 1160–61; Parker, supra note 34, at 1709–13. 
57. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 462 (M.D. Ala.) (three-
judge court) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 
215 (1967). 
58. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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statewide desegregation order.59 The court also left intact most of the 
state laws designed to maintain segregated schools.60 
The order did, however, break a racial barrier previously enforced 
in Alabama. In 1965 in Macon County, thirty-two African Americans 
were attending formerly all-white schools, and eight whites were atten-
ding formerly all–African American schools.61 Eleven years after Brown 
v. Board of Education, African Americans and whites were finally en-
rolled in the same school. Judge Johnson must be credited with creating 
integration, even if it only affected a fraction of the African American 
and white students.62 
In 1965, HEW became active in mandating school desegregation in 
Alabama. Apart from Judge Johnson’s remedial orders, HEW was 
threatening to cut off federal funding (significant for the first time after 
the passage of ESEA) if Alabama school districts refused to reach agree-
ment to desegregate.63 By fall 1965, Alabama increased its integration. 
Over 1,000 African American students were enrolled in formerly all-
white schools in about half of the Alabama school districts.64 Yet this 
still represented less than one percent of the total African American 
enrollment.65 
 
59. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 756 (M.D. Ala. 1964) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam) (“[A]t this particular time, this Court will 
not order desegregation in all the public schools of the State of Alabama.”). 
The court also held the tuition grant statute unconstitutional as applied to 
Macon Academy, but not unconstitutional otherwise. Id. at 754, 757–58. 
Most significantly, the court did not enter a specific desegregation order or 
compel the state to desegregate any schools. Id. at 756. Instead the court 
ordered the state not to intervene. Id. at 755. 
60. A tuition grant statute used to establish and fund segregation academies was 
only struck down to the extent that it was used to establish white schools in 
the face of integrated public schools. Id. at 754. Even more notably, Judge 
Johnson struck down the Alabama School Placement Law, which was desi-
gned to maintain segregated attendance with its rules for student assign-
ment, only when used to give African American students tests when they 
sought admission to white schools under court order to desegregate. Id. at 
757; see also supra note 56 (citations to scholarship on the discriminatory 
nature of pupil assignment laws). 
61. See Lansberg, supra note 12, at 882. 
62. Professor Lansberg properly gives Judge Johnson substantial credit for 
breaking this color barrier. See id. at 883–85. 
63. Parker, supra note 34, at 1720–21. 
64. See Lansberg, supra note 12, at 882. By 1965, eighty-four Alabama school 
districts had school desegregation plans approved by HEW. Sixteen school 
districts did not. Bagley, supra note 32, at 363. 
65. Bagley, supra note 32, at 363. 
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Judge Johnson’s 1967 order is the one that Professor Fiss gave such 
high praise and landed Judge Johnson on the cover of Time magazine.66 
It created a situation in Alabama mandating integration everywhere; 
Judge Johnson finally granted the plaintiffs’ requests for statewide 
relief. Whites would have no place to move in Alabama to avoid inte-
gration. The order was detailed, comprehensive in scope, and intended 
to address every possible aspect of unequal schooling in Alabama. 
The 1967 order mandated desegregation of what would later be 
known as the six Green factors—student assignment, faculty and staff 
assignment, facilities, transportation, and extra-curricular activities.67 
Judge Johnson detailed how the state defendants were to oversee school 
construction and consolidation; teacher recruitment, placement, certifi-
cation, and training; and school transportation.68 The State also had to 
file detailed reports to facilitate oversight of its efforts.69 
The order was also immediate. School districts (ninety-nine in all) 
only had twenty days to adopt desegregation plans, and Judge Johnson 
was quite specific in what those plans should require.70 Following Su-
preme Court precedent, the district court retained jurisdiction until the 
schools had been desegregated to the extent practical, or had 
transitioned to being a “unitary,” rather than “dual,” school system.71 
In sum, the order was comprehensive in scope, immediate in timing, 
and detailed in its requirements. One can understand the high praise 
Professor Fiss gave the order. 
Yet the remedy was also fundamentally limited: it allowed school 
districts to adopt freedom-of-choice plans.72 Such plans created inte-
gration only to the extent parents choose to send their child to a school 
not identified with their race. They were notorious for their ineffective-
ness in creating desegregation.73 Judge Johnson allowed freedom-of-
choice plans to continue until 1970, despite the objections of the private 
 
66. See Bass, supra note 2, at 235; see also Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 
267 F. Supp. 458, 480–82, 484–85 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (three-judge court) (per 
curiam) (detailing the 1967 order at length), aff’d sub nom. Wallace v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). 
67. Lee, 267 F. Supp. at 480–91; Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 
(1968). 
68. Lee, 267 F. Supp. at 480–82, 484, 488–90. 
69. Id. at 480–82, 484–85. The 1965–66 Tuition Grant Statute was also declared 
unconstitutional. Id. at 485. 
70. Id. at 486–91. 
71. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248, 250 (1991) (holding that federal 
court jurisdiction ends once school districts are declared “unitary”); Lee, 267 
F. Supp. at 486. 
72. Lee, 267 F. Supp. at 478–83. 
73. Johnson, supra note 18, at 1171. 
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plaintiffs and the United States and despite the Supreme Court’s sharp 
criticism of such plans in 1968 in Green v. County School Board.74 Nor 
were the freedom-of-choice plans particularly effective. Under the first 
year of the plans, HEW reported that only 5.4% of African American 
students were attending de jure white schools, a rate lower than any 
other state save Mississippi.75 
In early 1970, Judge Johnson stated that freedom-of-choice plans 
would be judged by their effectiveness.76 For school districts still seg-
regated, he required compulsory assignment to start in the fall of 1970.77 
As a result, the number of African Americans in formerly all-white 
schools quadrupled between 1968 and 1970.78 
That order concluded, however, most aspects of the statewide na-
ture of Lee v. Macon County. A three-judge court in 1970 ordered that 
the ninety-nine school districts be transferred to the federal district 
court encompassing that school district and be given their own docket 
number.79 The decision to break the statewide K–12 school desegre-
gation suit into individual suits was fundamentally practical. Judge 
Johnson had been personally supervising the desegregation of ninety-
nine school districts, along with the other educational institutions sub-
ject to Lee v. Macon County and other civil rights cases on his docket.80 
The creation of individual suits changed, however, the nature of the K–
 
74. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ala. 1968) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam) (“There simply are no other or more effec-
tive means reasonably available at this time that promise a speedier con-
version to a unitary system.”). The order required additional desegregation of 
faculty according to a specified ratio and the closure of underutilized African 
American schools. Id. at 367–68. The Department of Justice and private 
plaintiffs had argued that seventy-six of the ninety-nine school districts 
necessitated additional relief to comply with Green. Id. at 364–65; see also 
Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968) (sharply questioning 
freedom-of-choice plans because they “burden children and their parents with 
a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board”). 
75. Bagley, supra note 32, at 561. In the seventy-six school systems with new 
motions, over ninety percent of African American students would attend 
all-black black schools. Id. 
76. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 1172. 
77. Id. at 1171–72 
78. Bagley, supra note 32, at 644. 
79. See Lee v. Lee Cty. Bd. of Educ., 963 F. Supp. 1122, 1126–27 (M.D. Ala. 
1997). 
80. See Bass, supra note 2, at 230–31 (recounting Judge Johnson’s Saturday 
meetings with school districts to review their proposed desegregation plans); 
Johnson, supra note 18, at 1164–65 (detailing the amount of time the author 
spent on school desegregation cases); supra note 2 and accompanying text 
(describing the scope of the Lee v. Macon County lawsuit). 
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12 remedial approach from a statewide approach to one by school dis-
trict. Judge Johnson retained jurisdiction over the school districts with-
in the jurisdictional boundaries of the Middle District of Alabama, in-
cluding Macon County. 
After massive amounts of litigation from 1963 to 1970, Lee v. 
Macon County had succeeded in outlawing state laws designed to 
thwart school integration and had imposed compulsory assignment 
plans on all Alabama school districts. 
D. Unitary Status Proceedings 
The next major stage of Lee v. Macon County started in 1995. At 
that time, most of the school desegregation cases in Alabama were still 
subject to federal court jurisdiction. By 1995 most of the cases, however, 
had had little or no recent activity, a pattern far from unique to Ala-
bama.81 
Two judges in the Middle District of Alabama—U.S. District Court 
Judges W. Harold Albritton III and Myron H. Thompson (who replaced 
Judge Johnson)—took the novel step of not letting the existing school 
desegregation orders languish on their dockets. They instead issued 
orders in their pending school desegregation cases requiring the parties 
to investigate whether the school districts should be declared unitary 
and the cases dismissed.82 In other words, the plaintiffs would be forced 
to identify ways in which the school districts were not desegregated to 
the extent practicable. Further, the defendants would be required to 
redress those continuing vestiges of segregation or prove why they could 
not redress any existing disparities in their school system. 
In many respects, these orders were just as powerful as Judge John-
son’s 1967 order. By 1995, most federal district court judges had almost 
no involvement in their pending school desegregation cases.83 Judges 
Albritton and Thompson instead were requiring the parties to look 
anew at ways to use existing school desegregation litigation—now over 
thirty years old—to create more equality in Alabama schools. These 
orders again make Alabama uniquely situated to achieve meaningful 
reform through school desegregation litigation. It gave the plaintiffs a 
second chance to achieve equity in Alabama school desegregation. 
As was true in the 1960s, skilled lawyers represented the private 
plaintiffs, including lawyers from the NAACP-LDF. Experienced school 
desegregation lawyers from the Department of Justice represented the 
United States. Judge Thompson held that the state defendants were 
 
81. See Parker, supra note 26, at 1200–03 (finding a similar pattern in Georgia 
and Mississippi). 
82. See id. at 1205. 
83. See id. at 1211–13 (discussing reasons that school district litigation tends 
to sit idle on dockets). 
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still liable parties to the suit, specifically on the issue of facilities and 
special education.84 Thus, for a second time, private plaintiffs, state 
government, and the federal government were all litigating school 
desegregation issues. The unitary status proceedings gave the parties a 
chance to improve upon past attempts and to create more equitable 
schooling under the supervision of engaged judges. 
The scope of the unitary status proceedings was as comprehensive 
as the 1967 order, if not more. The parties focused not only on the 
Green factors but also on quality of education issues. Discipline, grad-
uation rates, gifted and talented placement, resource allocation, teacher 
salaries and demographics, curriculum, drop-out prevention, and special 
education placement all received special attention.85 Judge Thompson 
eventually issued statewide orders regarding the equitable distribution 
of facilities and the nondiscriminatory placement in special education.86 
All school districts save two have been declared fully unitary.87 The 
next Part examines some of the results of the efforts to desegregate 
Alabama schools. 
II. MIXED RESULTS 
Fifty-three years after Mr. Gray filed Lee v. Macon County—after 
all the time, resources, and energy put into desegregating Alabama 
schools—no one would argue that Lee v. Macon County has achieved 
all that the plaintiffs sought or even all that the judicial remedies man-
dated. Perhaps that is to be expected. As early as 1971, Chief Justice 
 
84. Lee v. Lee Cty. Bd. of Educ., 963 F. Supp. 1122, 1122–23, 1128–30 (M.D. 
Ala. 1997); see infra note 86 (noting the impact on special education).  
85. See Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School 
Desegregation and District Court Judges, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1623, 1653–55 
(2003). 
86. Lee v. Lee Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:70CV845, 2009 WL 1231497 (M.D. Ala. 
Apr. 28, 2009) (facilities order); Lee v. Lee Cty. Bd. of Educ., 476 F. Supp. 
2d 1356, 1360, 1362–64 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (requiring implementation of 
strategies to reduce the overrepresentation of African American students in 
the categories of mental retardation and emotional disturbance and under-
representation in the categories of specific learning disability and gifted). 
87. The two are Chambers County and Randolph County. Chambers County 
last filed a status report on October 22, 2013, but apparently has never 
sought unitary status. See Docket, Lee v. Chambers Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 
3:70-cv-844 (M.D. Ala. June 5, 1990) (showing last entry on Feb. 7, 2017). 
Randolph County, in a 2013 consent decree, has undertaken additional 
efforts to achieve unitary status in personnel issues; the school district has 
achieved unitary status in all other respects. Docket, Lee v. Randolph Bd. 
of Educ., No. 3:70-cv-847 (M.D. Ala. May 17, 1994) (showing last entry on 
Jan. 17, 2017); Consent Order, Lee v. Randolph Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:70-
cv-847 (April 16, 2013). 
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Warren E. Burger recognized the limits of school desegregation liti-
gation.88 Yet demonstrating the limits of school desegregation litigation 
in Alabama would be particularly notable given the promise of the suit. 
This Part studies the current situation in Alabama schools to 
evaluate how the schools measure up to the ultimate goals of school 
desegregation litigation—desegregating schools and promoting educat-
ional equity. The Section focuses on three indicators: the particular 
situation of Macon County, the site of the beginning of this lawsuit, 
and statewide data on teachers and achievement scores. Of course, the 
causal connection between litigation and the present situation is com-
plex and far beyond the scope of this Article. Yet the numbers presented 
below offer some indication of the success and limits of Lee v. Macon 
County. 
A. Macon County 
Despite the efforts of a Dream Team of lawyers and a progressive, 
engaged district court judge backed by a supportive court of appeals, 
Lee v. Macon County has not brought either integration or educational 
excellence to Macon County. African Americans in Macon County 
quickly learned the limits of judicial orders.89 
That limit became obvious as early as 1965. The first remedial order 
in 1963 compelled the integration of Tuskegee Public High School by 
thirteen carefully selected African American students.90 By 1968, how-
ever, that school transitioned to one-hundred percent African Ameri-
can.91 While the Lees and other families wanted their children to attend 
the better-financed Tuskegee Public High School, they never sought to 
have the school all to themselves. They had already experienced segre-
gation at Tuskegee Institute High School and found it lacking. Despite 
the efforts of Judge Johnson, the United States, and private plaintiffs, 
 
88. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22 (1971) (“One 
vehicle can carry only a limited amount of baggage.”). 
89. One of Tuskegee’s most famous African American citizens, Dr. Charles G. 
Gomillion, noted his disappointment as early as 1973. Norrell, supra note 
15, at 207. 
90. See supra notes 14–15, 56–58 and accompanying text. 
91. Within three days of opening in September 1963, all of the white students 
had left the high school, and the state ordered the school closed for the year. 
See Johnson, supra note 18, at 1168 (“[In 1963,] only 35 of the 250 white 
students appeared for classes. Within three days public pressure forced all of 
them to withdraw.”). The African American students finished that school year 
at Shorter and Notasulga High Schools. Id. Tuskegee Public High School re-
opened for the 1964–65 school year. The school was initially integrated, albeit 
with a fraction of its previous enrollment. Norrell, supra note 15, at 168. 
That integration was not sustainable. By the end of the 1968 school year, all 
the white students had left for other public high schools or Macon Academy. 
See id. at 194–95; Landsberg, supra note 12, at 879. 
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African American students in Tuskegee found themselves once again in 
a separate school. White flight, supported by the State of Alabama, 
thwarted the first goal of Lee v. Macon County to integrate Tuskegee 
Public High School.92 
The litigation, however, did not end in 1965. The federal courts 
maintained jurisdiction over the Macon County Board of Education for 
forty-one more years. During that long time, judicial involvement in 
Macon County was minimal, with one notable exception.93 
That exception concerned Notasulga High School, the only Macon 
County school with any appreciable white enrollment. From 1973 to 
1991, the school enrollment ranged from forty-two to fifty percent 
white. 94 In 1991, facing declining enrollment in the county, the school 
district sought judicial permission to close that school and reassign the 
students to a consolidated high school, where whites would be around 
six percent of the student population.95 Those protesting the plan were 
allowed to intervene as plaintiffs in the case.96 After two years of active 
litigation, that request was eventually denied by an equally divided, en 
banc Eleventh Circuit decision, thereby affirming a district court order 
protecting the continued operation of the one integrated school. 97 
 
92. The story at Notasulga High School in Macon County ended better at first. 
See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
93. See Docket, Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:70-CV-846 (M.D. Ala. 
June 24, 1970), ECF No. 1 (showing relatively little action over the course 
of thirty-five years). For example, the only judicial involvement in Macon 
County in 1970 and 1972 was the receipt of school district reports. Id. In 
1971, 1973, and 1974 the school district sought to change school district lines, 
apparently with little dispute and court involvement. Id. From 1977 to 1991, 
the case had no action, not even the filing of reports. Id. In 1997, the plaintiffs 
requested an investigation into the school district, but the request was denied. 
Id. In 2005, the school district sought judicial permission to close two schools, 
which was granted. Order, Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:70-CV-
846-T (M.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2005), ECF No. 101. 
94. The school initially was the site of significant white flight. In 1964, six 
African American students enrolled at the high school, and all the whites 
left. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 970 F.2d 767, 768 (11th Cir. 1992), 
aff’d en banc, 995 F.2d 184 (11th Cir. 1993). Arsonists then burned the 
building. Id. From 1965 to 1970, the school was all-white, until a 1970 plan 
was adopted to create integration. Id. While called a high school, it is a K–
12 school. Id. By 1973, the school opened with a student body almost evenly 
divided between African Americans and whites. Id. at 769. In 1991, the white 
population had dropped, but was still significant at forty-three percent. Id. 
95. Id. at 770. While Macon County was facing declining enrollment, Notasulga 
High School at the time was increasing its enrollment. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 184, 185 (11th Cir. 1993) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
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Yet even using school desegregation litigation to protect white 
students and their preference to keep open the only integrated school 
eventually proved futile. That school is now over ninety-nine percent 
African American, and only a handful of white students attend any 
public school in Macon County.98 In 2006, when the suit ended, the 
school district had an African American superintendent, an all–African 
American school board, and a faculty and staff over ninety-five percent 
African American. 99  Governor Wallace’s promise of “segregation 
tomorrow” has come true for the public schools in Macon County.100 
Ironically, the former segregation academy, Macon Academy, now re-
named Macon East Academy, is integrated.101 
 
98. Enrollment by Ethnicity and Gender (School Level), Macon County 2014–
2015, Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., http://web.alsde.edu/PublicData 
Reports/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/6UHK-BXY3] (reporting eleven 
white male students enrolled at Notasulga High School). In 2011–12, the 
school had reported twenty-eight white students. Enrollment by Ethnicity 
and Gender (School Level), Macon County 2011–2012, Ala. State Dep’t 
of Educ., http://web.alsde.edu/PublicDataReports/Default.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/6UHK-BXY3]. It is impossible to know the exact number of white 
students because categories with fewer than ten students are listed with a 
“*” rather than an exact number. Id. In 2005, when Macon County was 
declared unitary, Notasulga High School was fourteen percent white. Lee v. 
Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:70-CV-846-MHT, 2006 WL 1381873, at *2 
(M.D. Ala. May 22, 2006). 
99. See Lee, 2006 WL 1381873, at *2. The county’s population remains pre-
dominately African American. Id. (finding that the county’s population was 
84.6% African American in 2000). The public only identified one concern 
with the grant of unitary status—the protection of and support for Notasulga 
High School. Id. at *4. A former high school principal expressed concern with 
irregular student transfers, but a follow-up investigation did not substantiate 
the concern. Id. at *4–5. 
100. Enrollment by Ethnicity and Gender (System Level), Macon County 2012–
2013, Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., http://web.alsde.edu/PublicData 
Reports/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/6UHK-BXY3] (showing twelve 
white female students and thirteen white male students for the district). In 
2013, the number of white female and male students had dropped below the 
individualized reporting threshold of ten. Enrollment by Ethnicity and 
Gender (System Level), Macon County 2013–2014, Ala. State Dep’t of 
Educ., http://web.alsde.edu/PublicDataReports/Default.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/6UHK-BXY3]. 
101. Wendy Parker, Brown’s 60th Anniversary: A Story of Judicial Isolation, in 
The Pursuit of Racial and Ethnic Equality in American Public 
Schools, 108 (Kristi L. Bowman ed., 2015); see also Bagley, supra note 32, 
at 689 (reporting that, when segregationist academies were forced to accept 
black students in the 1990s to improve their finances, they were able to 
replicate the limited impact of freedom-of-choice plans in the 1960s and 
1970s). 
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Nor is the public school system particularly strong in its educational 
outcomes. On the statewide test for reading, less than eleven percent of 
third graders met or exceeded academic standards for reading, but the 
number increased to 35.38% for eighth graders and 37.15% for tenth 
graders.102 Math scores are weaker and unfortunately declined the long-
er the student was in the system. Third graders demonstrated academic 
proficiency at a rate of 28.76%, but that rate dropped to below 5.62% 
for eighth graders and 3.82% for tenth graders.103 Yet the school district 
has strong graduation rates. About eighty-nine percent of students gra-
duate, which is the same as the state average.104 
The ability of Lee v. Macon County to achieve desegregated school 
buildings should not be judged solely by the results in Macon County. 
A statewide perspective of school building desegregation is entirely war-
ranted given the scope of the lawsuit. A National Assessment of Edu-
cational Progress (NAEP) report quantified the degree of racial segre-
gation in schools on a statewide basis by comparing the percentage of 
African American students in a school attended by a white student with 
the percentage of African American students in a school attended by 
an African American student.105 Any difference in the average is one 
indication of school segregation on a state level. 
In 2011, the average white student in Alabama attended a school 
that was nineteen percent African American, while the percent for the 
average African American student was sixty-three percent African 
American, resulting in a difference of forty-four percentage points.106 
The gap in Alabama is slightly worse than for the United States as a 
whole, where the gap is thirty-nine percentage points.107 The difference 
in Alabama is also higher than most of its comparable states. Georgia, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia all 
 
102. These numbers are found in the 2014 ACT Aspire and ACT Plan reports 
for Macon County. Assessment Reporting System, Ala. State Dep’t of 
Educ., https://www03.alsde.edu/accountability/accountability.asp [https:// 
perma.cc/SPQ7-HAPQ]. 
103. Id. 
104. Graduation Rate, 2014–2015 Cohort Graduation Rate, Ala. State Dep’t 
of Educ., https://www.alsde.edu/dept/data/Pages/graduationrate-all.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6FLA-7MLU]. 
105. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., School 
Composition and the Black–White Achievement Gap 23 (2015), 
https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/subject/studies/pdf/school_composi
tion_and_the_bw_achievement_gap_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF2S-
GBDZ]. 
106. Id. at 24 fig.12. 
107. Id. 
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had a smaller gap.108 This study indicates that segregation continues to 
be at issue in Alabama, as it is for all of the United States. Segregated 
school buildings may be of particular concern in Alabama given that its 
surrounding states have so far had higher success in achieving inte-
grated school buildings.109 
B. Decline in African American Teachers 
This Section shifts from students to teachers. From its early stages, 
the transition from “‘white’ school or ‘Negro’ school[s] [to] just 
schools”110 included the desegregation of faculties. 111 A school’s staff 
and faculty was part of a school’s racial identity. 
At least initially, some African American teachers and principals 
had serious concerns with the quest to end de jure segregation.112 Al-
though underpaid as compared to their white counterparts and lacking 
the financial resources found in white schools, African American teach-
ers and principals fared better than most African American workers did 
under de jure segregation.113 They were generally well respected in their 
communities and comparably well paid. 
The end of de jure segregation often meant the closing of under-
funded and under-maintained African American schools. Sometimes 
 
108. Id. Specifically, the gap in Georgia was thirty-seven; Louisiana, thirty-three; 
Mississippi, forty-three; North Carolina, twenty-seven; South Carolina, 
twenty-three; and Virginia, twenty-seven. Id. Notably, Georgia, Mississippi, 
and South Carolina also had statewide suits. See David L. Norman, The 
Strange Career of the Civil Rights Division’s Commitment to Brown, 93 
Yale L.J. 983, 987 n.17 (1984). 
109. In 1980, Alabama had made greater strides in enrollment of African Ameri-
can students in predominately white schools than other Southern states. 
Gary Orfield, Public School Desegregation in the United States, 
1968–1980, at 6 tbl.3 (1983), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-
12-education/integration-and-diversity/public-school-desegregation-in-the-
united-states-1968-1980/orfield_american-desegregation-1983.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/M6DS-PGWP] (noting that 44.3% of black students were enrolled 
in predominately white schools in 1980, an increase of thirty-six points since 
1968, ahead of all Southern and Border states but Delaware, Kentucky, and 
Florida); see also id. at 50, app. A (reflecting that 31.9% of African American 
students in Alabama attended schools at least ninety percent African 
American). 
110. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968). 
111. For a description of this history, see Wendy Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 
86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 8–15 (2008). 
112. Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts 391 (1994) (“We had not 
anticipated how seriously black teachers would be at risk during desegre-
gation.”). 
113. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 391–92 (Vintage Books 1977) (1975); 
Greenberg, supra note 112, at 391; Adam Fairclough, The Costs of Brown: 
Black Teachers and School Integration, 91 J. Am. Hist. 43, 49 (2004). 
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African American teachers were re-assigned to the formerly all-white 
schools, but that re-assignment was often coupled with a demotion. 
Fairly frequent was the outright loss of jobs. One estimate is that al-
most 40,000 African American teachers lost their jobs between 1954 
and 1972.114 An estimated 150 plus African American men in Alabama 
lost their principalships.115 A study in 1970 estimated that over “[o]ne-
third of the estimated 10,500 black teachers in [Alabama] have been 
dismissed, demoted or pressured into resigning.”116 
Even if the teachers kept their jobs and their status, they faced 
extreme parental (and school district) resistance. 117 Judge Wisdom 
lamented that integration of faculty was “[t]he most difficult problem 
in the desegregation process.”118 Putting an African American teacher 
in charge of a white child, or an African American principal over a 
white teacher, represented a tangible shift in power. African American 
families as well often mourned the loss of African American teachers for 
their children.119 
Sixty years after Brown, the percentage of African American teach-
ers in Alabama is lower than it was under de jure segregation. In 1939, 
1949, and 1959, the percentage of African American teachers was 
around thirty percent.120 Today, the percentage has dropped a third, to 
 
114. Jacqueline Jordan Irvine, Black Students and School Failure 34–
35 (1990) (reporting that 39,386 black teachers lost their teaching jobs in the 
South between 1954 and 1972). 
115. Fairclough, supra note 113, at 54 (“The main casualties of integration were 
the black schools and the men who had run them. . . . In Alabama, the 
number of black principals declined from 210 to 57, in Virginia from 170 to 
16.”); Russell W. Irvine & Jacqueline Jordan Irvine, The Impact of the 
Desegregation Process on the Education of Black Students: Key Variables, 
52 J. Negro Educ. 410, 417 (1983) (reporting that “there was a ninety per-
cent reduction in the number of black principals in the South between the 
years 1964 and 1973, dropping from over 2000 to less than 200”). 
116. Robert W. Hooker, Displacement of Black Teachers in the 
Eleven Southern States 18 (1970), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ 
ED047036.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UG5-ZUEY]. 
117. Parker, supra note 111, at 12–13. 
118. United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 892 (5th Cir. 
1966), aff’d per curiam, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967) (en banc). 
119. For details of the situation faced by African American teachers and staff in 
Alabama, see Bagley, supra note 32, at 517–18, 588–89. 
120. In 1939, the figure was 28.96% African American teachers; in 1949, 33.24%. 
See Truman M. Pierce, et al., White and Negro Schools in the 
South 184 tbl.46 (1955). The figure was 32.2% in 1959. See S. Educ. 
Reporting Serv., Statistical Summary of School Segregation-
Desegregation in the Southern and Border States 5 (Jim Leeson 
ed., May 1961) [hereinafter Statistical Summary], https://babel. 
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around twenty percent.121 By way of comparison, the percentage of Afri-
can American students in Alabama has stayed fairly constant from 1939 
to the present, around thirty-three percent.122 
While the initial decline in African American teachers was certainly 
directly tied to the closing of de jure African American schools, the 
current numbers are certainly caused by a myriad of factors. The reason 
for the decline is obviously beyond the scope of this Article, and may 
be caused mainly by the opening of more career opportunities for edu-
cated African Americans than Jim Crow allowed. I mention the decline, 
however, because most people view the loss of African American 
teachers as a loss to the African American community. That loss is 
often overlooked in examinations of school desegregation outcomes and 
is worthy of any evaluation of the results of school desegregation liti-
gation. 
In Lee v. Macon County, Judge Johnson first ordered the integra-
tion of faculties in 1966.123 During the unitary status proceedings that 
began in 2005, the issue of the lack of hiring of African American 
teachers would sometimes arise, and some school districts were required 
to take additional steps to increase their number of African American 
teachers.124 At this stage, many considered school desegregation liti-
gation as a successful way to promote the hiring of African American 
teachers.125 
 
hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015016912365;view=1up;seq=3 [https:// 
perma.cc/SQ7P-3FJQ]. 
121. By 1999, Alabama’s teaching population was seventeen percent African 
American; the percentage increased to twenty percent by 2009. Ala. State 
Dep’t of Educ., 1998 Alabama Education Statistics: A Summary (on 
file with author). For the 2015–16 school year, the percentage was 19.5%. 
Quick Facts 2015–2016, Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., https://www. 
alsde.edu/sec/comm/Quick%20Facts/QF-2016-ONLINE.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/J88K-WMQC] (last updated Aug. 3, 2016). 
122. In 1939 and 1949 the percentage of African American students in Alabama 
was the same: 34.7%. See Pierce, supra note 120, at 110 tbl.20. In 1959, the 
number had dropped slightly, to 34.5%. See Statistical Summary, supra 
note 120, at 5. In 1999, the percentage of African American students in 
Alabama was thirty-six percent; in 2009, thirty-five percent. 1998 Alabama 
Education Statistics, supra note 121. For the 2015-16 school year, the 
percentage was 33.2%. Quick Facts 2015–2016, supra note 121. 
123. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 472–73 (M.D. Ala.) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 
389 U.S. 215 (1967); Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 253 F. Supp. 727, 729 
(M.D. Ala. 1966) (three-judge court) (per curiam). 
124. See Parker, supra note 101, at 108 (noting significant improvements in the 
area of minority teacher employment). 
125. Id.; see also Bagley, supra note 32, at 751 (quoting interview with Lee 
plaintiff attorney Solomon Seay as reporting that unitary status proceedings 
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C. Achievement Scores 
One of the outcomes of de jure segregation and its attending in-
equality of resources was a racial difference in achievement scores, with 
white students typically outperforming African American students. 
Nationally, that gap decreased rapidly throughout the 1970s, increased 
a little in the 1980s and 1990s, and is now on the decline again.126 
Given that Lee v. Macon County was a statewide suit, it seems fair 
to evaluate the progress Alabama has had in reducing its racial achieve-
ment gap. In Alabama, African American students continue to under-
perform as compared to their white counterparts. For example, accord-
ing to the 2015 ACT Aspire tests in reading, African American sixth 
graders were deemed proficient at a rate of twenty-four percent, com-
pared to white students at fifty-four percent, a gap of thirty points.127 
In math, the African American sixth graders were proficient thirty-two 
percent of the time, compared to sixty-percent of whites, a gap of 
twenty-eight points. 128 The difference was a little lower for eighth 
graders. White students in eighth grade were proficient in reading fifty-
three percent of the time, as compared to twenty-nine percent African 
 
in the 2000s were often concerned with protecting the rights of African 
American staff and teachers). 
126. Stanford University’s Center for Education Policy Analysis has established 
a comprehensive Educational Opportunity Monitoring Project, which tracks 
national trends. Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps, Stan. Ctr. for 
Educ. Pol’y Analysis, http://cepa.stanford.edu/educational-opportunity-
monitoring-project/achievement-gaps/race/#second [https://perma.cc/ 
YR8C-G39Z] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). Nationally, the racial achievement 
gap has declined about fifteen to twenty percent between the 1970s and 2012. 
Id.; see also Alan Vanneman, et al., NAEP Educ. Statistics Servs. 
Inst., Achievement Gaps: How Black and White Students in Public 
Schools Perform in Mathematics and Reading 6, 28 (July 2009) 
[hereinafter NAEP Report], http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/ 
studies/2009455.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7RJ-TM7S] (providing similar 
tables). The numbers in Alabama have declined since 1990. For example, 
the difference in math achievement scores for eighth graders declined from 
1.1 standard deviation in 1990 to 0.9 standard deviation. See Racial and 
Ethnic Achievement Gaps, supra. For reading, the standard deviation for 
eighth graders in Alabama declined from 0.89 to 0.77. Id. 
127. Percentage Proficient by Grade and Race in Reading on 2015 ACT Aspire, 
Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., https://www.alsde.edu/dept/data/ 
Assessment%20Data/Aspire%20Reading%20Results%20by%20Race%20Gr
aph.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SBB-QB5Z]. 
128. Percentage Proficient by Grade and Race in Mathematics on 2015 ACT 
Aspire, Ala. State Dep’t of Educ., https://www.alsde.edu/dept/ 
data/Assessment%20Data/Aspire%20Math%20Results%20by%20Race%
20Graph.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G2J-FZQN]. 
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American students, a difference of twenty-four points.129 For math the 
scores for eighth grade white students was thirty-seven percent; African 
American, eleven percent, a difference of twenty-six points.130 
One obvious question is how Alabama compares to other states. If 
Alabama is doing a better job than most states in reducing the achie-
vement gap, that would indicate a notable success for the State that 
perhaps could be linked to Lee v. Macon County. One recent study 
found that at least four Alabama school districts are not doing a better 
job than most school districts in erasing the racial achievement gap. 
The study identified twenty school districts with the largest achieve-
ment gaps between 2009 and 2011, and the twenty with the smallest. 
Four Alabama school districts were on the list of the districts with the 
largest gaps, and no Alabama school district made it to the list of the 
districts with the smallest gaps.131 
Likewise, a NCES study of the entire state did not indicate Ala-
bama outperforming the rest of the country or its fellow Southern states 
in erasing the achievement gap.132 Using 2007 data for eighth graders 
 
129.  Percentage Proficient by Grade and Race in Reading on 2015 ACT Aspire, 
supra note 127. 
130.  Percentage Proficient by Grade and Race in Mathematics on 2015 ACT 
Aspire, supra note 128. 
131. See Sean F. Reardon, et al., The Geography of Racial/Ethnic Test Score 
Gaps, 50 fig.4 (Stanford Ctr. for Educ. Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 
16-10, 2016), https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/wp16-10-v201604 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VW3-D4XE]. The four school districts are (in the 
order listed) Auburn City, Vestavia Hills, Tuscaloosa City, and Homewood 
City. Id. The school districts range in the number of students qualifying for 
free or reduced meals from less than ten percent for Vestavia Hills to forty-
eight percent in Tuscaloosa City. 2015–2016 Free Lunch for System and 
School Reports, https://web.alsde.edu/PublicDataReports/Default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/ED2C-CUYC] (select Free Lunch By System and School 
from drop down menu, then select 2015–2016 from year drop down menu, 
then select Vestivia Hills or Tuscaloosa under System Name drop down menu 
and select View Report). The percentage of African American students for the 
four school districts ranged from a low of less than seven percent for Vestavia 
Hills to seventy-one percent for Tuscaloosa City. 2015-2016 Enrollment by 
Ethnicity and Gender (System Level), https://web.alsde.edu/PublicData 
Reports/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/ED2C-CUYC] (select Enrollment 
By Ethnicity and Gender (System Lwvel) from the drop down menu, then 
select 2015–2016 from the year drop down menu, then Vestivia Hills or 
Tuscaloosa under System Name drop down meny and select View Report). 
Interestingly, Homewood and Vestavia are school districts located near 
Birmingham that were created after the school district for sued in 1965 for 
desegregation. See Bagley, supra note 32, at 737. Both were initially over 
ninety percent white, although they were included in the school desegregation 
order for the county included their school districts and Birmingham. See 
Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1971). 
132. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra note 105, at 15 fig.10. 
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in math, the study found the racial achievement gap in Alabama to be 
thirty-one percentage points. That gap is the same for the nation as a 
whole and for South Carolina.133 In five states comparable to Alabama, 
however, the achievement gap is smaller.134 This data suggests that 
Alabama is doing worse than its surrounding states, which also had de 
jure school segregation. 
III. THE VALUE OF LEE V. MACON COUNTY 
Given the early promise of Lee v. Macon County, this Part exam-
ines why the schools of Alabama remain so segregated and unequal. 
Academics have long debated the wisdom of relying on the judiciary, 
instead of grassroots movements, to effectuate social change in schools. 
Most prominently perhaps, Professor Gerald Rosenberg in The Hollow 
Hope contends that schools became integrated only after Congress and 
the Executive Branch gave their institutional support.135 He affords the 
judiciary little independent value in desegregating schools. 136  He 
endorses direct action over litigation and would likely argue that Lee v 
Macon County is another example of the limits of judicial action.137 
Professor Rosenberg’s thesis is fairly consistent with Lee v. Macon 
County from 1963 to 1970. School integration in Alabama was almost 
non-existent until Congress passed the ESEA and HEW began its en-
forcement efforts.138 Even the Alabama judges recognized the import-
ance of the other federal branches. In the 1967 remedial order, the three-
judge panel specifically mentions the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
HEW’s support of school integration.139 The judges also acknowledge 
 
133. Id. at 25 fig.13. 
134. Id. In Georgia, the gap is twenty-nine points; Louisiana, twenty-three; 
Mississippi, twenty-seven; North Carolina, twenty-nine; and Virginia, 
twenty-nine. Id. 
135. Rosenberg, supra note 11, at 42–156. 
136. Id. at 106 (“Courts can matter, but only sometimes, and only under limited 
conditions.”). 
137. See id. at 431 (“[T]here is no substitute for political action.”). 
138. For example, the actual integration achieved under Judge Johnson’s 1963–
65 orders affected less than half of one percent of Alabama African American 
students. Id. at 433 (showing the percentage to be 0.43% in 1965). Once 
HEW became involved in Alabama (and Judge Johnson’s orders expanded 
substantially), that number increased to just under five percent in 1966 and 
a remarkable eighty percent by 1970. Id.; see also supra notes 64–65, 78 and 
accompanying text (discussing this massive jump). 
139. Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 464-66 (M.D. Ala. 1967) 
(three-judge court) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 
389 U.S. 215 (1967). 
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their own delay in ordering statewide relief.140 I therefore agree with 
Rosenberg that all three branches of government, working together, 
produced substantial integration in Alabama. 
Yet that consistency does not mean that Lee v. Macon County was 
of minor importance. First, while the judicial delay in Lee v. Macon 
County was wrong—Judge Johnson should have granted Mr. Gray’s 
motion for statewide relief in 1964 instead of 1967—the delay is more 
excusable than Professor Rosenberg would likely allow.141 Judge John-
son and the lawyers appearing before him faced an extreme situation in 
Alabama, especially from 1963 to 1965. To name perhaps the two most 
notable: four young African American girls died in a bombing of Six-
teenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham just days after Governor 
Wallace ordered Tuskegee High School closed; and African Americans 
were savagely beaten as they first tried to cross the Edmund Pettis 
Bridge from Selma to Montgomery on March 7, 1965.142 Judge Johnson 
and the lawyers appearing in Lee v. Macon County were intimately 
involved in these matters as well. Their work in Alabama was directed 
not just at schooling, but to other important civil rights issues as well.143 
In Alabama, from 1963 to 1965 particularly, the judicial delay was due 
in part to depth of the many civil rights issues facing the federal courts 
and litigants. The urgency of those other civil rights issues makes imme-
diacy in creating integrated schools via court order less likely, but does 
not indicate the unimportance of courts. 
Relatedly, the suit also failed in many respects because of the 
difficulty of the educational problems it identified and exposed. How 
could a single lawsuit—even one with all the promise of Lee v. Macon 
County—create “just” schools where the vestiges of discrimination are 
eliminated to the “extent practicable?”144 That failure, however, does 
not indicate the inadequacy of judicial efforts; instead, it indicates the 
depth of the issues facing the judiciary. 
 
140. Id. at 465 (“[I]t is now evident that the reasons for this Court’s reluctance 
to grant the relief to which these plaintiffs were clearly entitled over two 
years ago are no longer valid.”). 
141. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (pointing out the ground-breaking 
nature of Judge Johnson’s second remedial order). 
142. David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross 291, 394–99 (2004). 
143. See generally Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta 
and the Long History of the Civil Rights Movement (2011) (ex-
ploring how the role of civil rights leaders helped craft the meaning of con-
stitutional doctrine). 
144. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435, 442 (1968) (requiring the 
transition from “dual” schools to “just schools”); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 
U.S. 237, 248, 250 (1991) (mandating the end of school desegregation 
litigation once the school district had eliminated the vestiges of discrimi-
nation “to the extent practicable”). 
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Moreover, the ideal situation of all three branches of the federal 
government supporting integration was incredibly short-lived. Since 
1970, the federal branches of government have not converged in the 
cause of school integration. Nor is that likely to change in the near 
future. Congress rarely lends any support to integration of school build-
ings; other education initiatives like choice, accountability, and testing 
top Congressional agendas instead.145 Today even the ESEA is of limit-
ed utility; amendments in 2016 have substantially limited federal in-
volvement in local schools.146 
Today’s activists do not face the situation in the late 1960s that 
Professor Rosenberg details. Today the federal courts are the only fed-
eral entity where activists are at the very least guaranteed the oppor-
tunity to expose educational inequalities. The federal judiciary has no 
choice but to hear such plaintiffs once its jurisdiction is properly evoked. 
Lawsuits, in other words, are a method of publically exposing the reality 
of segregated and unequal schooling.147 
In other words, the federal judiciary today offers activists a place 
for their activism. No one expects students to boycott their schools or 
sit-in at the better schools. A place matters today, and the mandatory 
nature of federal district court jurisdiction gives the plaintiffs a platform 
to take their complaints. 
Lee v. Macon County demonstrates that importance. In 1995, 
Judges Albritton and Thompson gave plaintiffs a forum when they 
ordered the parties to look anew at the pending Lee v. Macon County 
suits for ways to eliminate vestiges of discrimination.148 These remark-
able orders required plaintiffs to investigate current inequalities in the 
school districts—and the access to relevant information through dis-
covery. I can think of no other way that plaintiffs could get the detailed 
information they received through discovery. The orders also directed 
the school districts to answer publically, to a federal judge, as to why 
 
145. See generally James E. Ryan, Five Miles Away, A World Apart: One 
City, Two Schools, and the Story of Educational Opportunity in 
Modern America 241–67 (2010) (criticizing recent choice, testing, and 
accountability legislation for their failure to create meaningful reform). 
146. Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every 
Student Succeeds Act, 105 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript 
at 3) (“The [2016 amendments to ESEA] reverse[] the federal role in edu-
cation and return[] nearly full discretion to states.”). 
147. This argument is consistent with one advocated about the Montgomery bus 
boycott—that both the bus boycott and the Supreme Court’s eventual 
prohibition of segregated bus seats were necessary to effectuate change. 
Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social 
Movements and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus 
Protest, 30 L. & Soc. Inquiry 663, 666 (2005) (arguing that the “synergy 
between social movements and litigation” produced integrated buses). 
148. See supra Part I.D. 
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they could not create more equality in their school buildings. The judges 
forced the parties to come together to explore ways to further educa-
tional equality. Most remarkably, the orders gave the plaintiffs a place 
at the school district’s table of setting its policy and practices. 
CONCLUSION 
Brown I broke new ground by declaring that “in the field of public 
education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”149 Nine 
years later, so did Mr. Gray when he filed Lee v. Macon County. Until 
then, Alabama had completely avoided any implementation of Brown 
I. Not one African American student attended school with a white stu-
dent.150 While Alabama schools today still struggle with segregation and 
educational inequalities, that reality indicates the difficulty and scope 
of the task more than the weakness of litigation. After all, litigation is 
just one vehicle on the road to racial justice. Thankfully, Mr. Gray 
moved us closer to that goal when he filed Lee v. Macon County. 
 
149. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See generally Justin Driver, 
Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 149 (2011) 
(arguing that Brown was not an example of interest-convergence between 
black and white interests, but an instance of true leadership by the Supreme 
Court). 
150. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
